We present an analysis of the evolution of regulatory independence in practice for 23 Latin American and Caribbean countries in the telecommunications industry. Based on this analysis, we construct realistic indices of regulatory independence, which improve upon the measures of independence that have been used so far in the empirical regulation literature. We show that legal indices may give a partially distorted picture of the commitment ability of institutions. The combination of de facto and de jure independence has a positive (probably modest) impact on network penetration in telecommunications markets, although treating independence as exogenous may underestimate its impact.
Introduction
Institutions matter in any field of economic policy. For example, the econometric treatment of the effects of good institutions on macroeconomic performance is a very active field of research, and is increasingly inspiring empirical research in microeconomic policies. Credible commitments are seen as one of the few recommendations that survive after many studies, although the recommendation leaves broad space to fill in the details. Levy and Spiller (1996) stress this point for the case of the regulation of privatized utilities.
The analysis of the independence of regulatory agencies is part of this increasing interest in the institutions of economic policy. Independence is seen in the economics literature as a way to strategically delegate into an agent (the regulator) who is more reluctant than a representative government to expropriate specific investments. Mishkin (2006) argues however that "although dealing with time-inconsistency problems by appointing a conservative policymaker has attractive theoretical properties, it is not so easy to implement in practice." Mishkin points out difficulties with this approach to solving the time-inconsistency problem, using the example of monetary policy. It may 1 We thank Carlos Cardoso for excellent research assistance. We also thank comments received at ISNIE 2009 conference in Berkeley, especially from Stefan Voigt, and feedback from Jon Stern over the years.
be hard to find a central banker with the "right" preferences and it is hard to believe that politicians would naturaly want to appoint central bankers with different preferences than theirs, so that a regime based on having a conservative central banker is unlikely to be stable over time. Similar objections apply to appointment of a conservative regulator/supervisor.
An independent regulatory agency is also seen as a way to attract professional experts 2 The problem of course is that independence does not solve, but it relocates, the commitment problem, which transforms itself into one of the government credibly committing not to undermine the independence of the regulator, which many jurisdictions have found very difficult. In a definition of Central Bank independence, Walsh (2005, 10) states that "legal measures of Central Bank independence may not reflect the relationship between the Central Bank and the government that actually exists in practice." Hence, the importance of developing continuous indices of independence in practice.
and to stabilize policies in the presence of political volatility (see Evans et al., 2007) . The idea of strategically delegating into "independent" agents has gained predicament in the recent decades, but it is not new. Troesken's (1996) study of the transition between local and state regulation in the US reports that local regulations were decided mostly directly by the City Council. However, occasionally, experts were called, but (interestingly for our purposes) their advice was not always heeded: in the fall of 1910, months before the 1911 mayoral election in Chicago, the city hired W.J.
Hagenah to head an investigation into the costs of manufacturing and distributing coal gas. Hagenah, chief accountant of Wisconsin's utilities commission, spent six months investigating the company's plants and books. Several engineers and accountants associated with the Wisconsin (the neighbouring state) utilities commission helped in the investigation. Hagenah presented his report to the city council in mid-April, shortly after the election. He recommended that the price of gas be set at 77 cents -per MCF or one thousand cubic feet-. Since many of the elected councillors had endorsed during the electoral campaigned the proposals of the "70 Cent Gas League," the city council tabled Hagenah's report, introducing an ordinance reducing gas rates to 70 cents, and began searching for a new expert.
Work on the measurement of Telecommunications Regulatory Agencies (TRA) independence has mostly analyzed legal or de jure independence but not independence in practice or de facto independence. Most, but not all, of the work on legal independence has used dichotomous dummy variables, and these, as Estache et al. (2006, 12) point out, "may not capture the degree of independence". Others use indices reporting about the legal framework: whether there is primary legislation requiring an independent regulator, how is it funded, to whom should he or she report, etc.
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Even if it was possible to measure independence accurately, it is not axiomatic however that regulator independence should have a positive effect on industry performance. One of the weaknesses of independent agencies mentioned by Bernstein (1955) is lack of coordination with the general government (p.101: "the limited jurisdiction of most commissions narrows the administrative vision of the public interest"). Bernstein argues that one of the problems of insulation from the political process is precisely that lack of political skills may reduce the public support for the role of the regulatory agency. For example (p.101): "Independence is a device to escape popular politics. It facilitates maximum responsiveness by a commission to the demands and interests of regulated groups. It provides maximum freedom from exposure to popular political forces. It tends to alienate commissions from sources of political strength, especially the president, upon whom regulatory progress may largely depend.
Independence acquires a sacred inviolability because it reduces the effectiveness of regulation and seems to satisfy the Congressional desire to lessen the power and authority of the president." We nevertheless show below that independence had a positive impact on telecommunications performance in Latin America and the Caribbean in the recent past, although this impact is probably modest.
. By independence in practice or de facto independence we mean what actually happens in the real relationship of regulatory agencies with the rest of government, and which could be measured (at least in part).
We measure below independence in practice (for telecommunications 4 show telecommunications regulators' turnover ratio and allow us to quantify their vulnerability. We use these studies to analyze the impact of independence. The empirical methodology draws from the literature on Central Bank Independence. In the rest of this paper, in Section 2 we present some background on the independence debate.
In Section 3 we present the case studies on 23 countries and build on these to construct indices of independence in practice. In Section 4 we put our measures to work, analyzing the determinants of penetration in fixed telephony, including an analysis of potential endogeneity problems. And finally we conclude in Section 5.
Theoretical Framework and Related Literature
In infrastructure industries, the importance of institutions is mainly driven by the sunk nature of the investments needed, which is the source of a time inconsistency problem, highlighted by Levy and Spiller (1996) , Shirley et al. (2000) , Noll (2000) , Noll and Shirley (2002) , Gutiérrez (2003a), Levine et al. (2005) and Newbery (2000) , among others. Many countries face major difficulties in inducing sufficient investment to meet demand at an acceptable cost. The reason is that given the long-lived nature of sunk assets, unless firms have expectations that prices will be sufficiently high over time, they will be reluctant to invest. But at a given moment in time, if investments have already been sunk, policy makers under pressure from consumers will be tempted to fix low prices. Hence, the role of the regulatory institutions is crucial in providing the credibility that will support the necessary investment flows.
The following picture of an extensive form game summarizes with the simplest of models the time inconsistency problem in regulation that gives rise to the "independence" solution:
these other sectors. Underinvestment in the face of regulatory time inconsistency problems, however, has resurfaced in telecommunications as countries debate how to create a framework to promote next generation fiber networks, in spite of the increasing role played by competition and technological change.
In the game described in the picture, first a firm makes a decision on whether to undertake a specific investment (for example, a fibre optic network) or not, and next the regulator, if the firm has invested, decides whether to fix a price that remunerates the investment, or to expropriate this investment (zero price). The payoff of the firm is P-I, whereas the payoff of the (consumer welfare maximizing) regulator is 2I-P.
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The expropriation of the quasi-rents derived from specific investment may not necessarily take the form of too low prices, but it can take other forms, such as unexpected investment requirements, costly unanticipated quality improvements, or requirements to hire inefficient staff. Policy makers may follow this path and still benefit from the (already in place) investments. Ex ante, however, investors will anticipate this, and investment levels will be sub-optimal. The opportunity cost of reneging will depend on country characteristics, such as the institutional endowment, the degree of income inequality, or the nature of fiscal systems. In countries with By backwards induction, if the firm has invested (I=1), the regulator will rationally fix P=0, and, anticipating this, the firm will not invest (I=0). Hence, in a sub-game perfect equilibrium, there is no investment. More realistic settings would include many other real world details, but if there is no commitment and assets are sunk, under-investment would remain a serious concern, perhaps in the form of bad maintenance or use of inefficient technologies.
5 Any objective function of the regulator equal to γI-P with γ>1 would yield the same results. We use γ=2 for concreteness.
skewed income distributions, governments pay a political price in terms of not satisfying the median (relatively poor) voter if they do not renege on promises made to remunerate specific investments. The problem may be alleviated by long term contracts, repeated interactions, reputational mechanisms or institutions that make credible that the P=0 path will not be taken. Historically, public ownership (the state internalizing the firm's problem) has been a way to alleviate time inconsistency, but in the recent decades policy makers in many countries recognized that the costs of public ownership in terms of public funds and inefficient practices outweighed its benefits. Thus, the solution of privatizing and strategically delegating into an independent regulator who cares to a certain extent about the firm's rents, in a similar way that governments delegate into an inflation-averse central banker (see Levine et al., 2005) . The need for experts in technologically complex sectors and the wish to give certainty in politically volatile regions reinforce the argument of independence.
However, it is not axiomatic that independence will automatically yield good investment results, as there are other mechanisms to achieve commitment, to attract experts, and to avoid political volatility. For example, it is widely recognized that Chile has achieved a high degree of commitment in privatizing utilities through a very detailed and difficult to change legislation. It is an empirical question whether Chile is an exception that can be explained by its unique history and a very specific political and institutional system that makes policy reversal very difficult, or whether it is an example that can be generalized.
One problem of course is that independence does not solve, but it relocates, the commitment problem, which transforms itself into one of the government credibly committing not to undermine the independence of the regulator, which many countries have found very difficult, as we show below in Section 3. Then a potential measure of independence in practice is for how long do politicians respect the period in office of appointed regulators. And this is the research strategy we follow below.
An independent (or at least separate from government) regulator is generally associated with attempts to reform regulation. Wallsten (2001, 8) argues that having a separate regulator is a sign of how willing a country is to reform regulation. There are at least ten studies about telecommunications regulation which measure legal (de jure) independence of the regulatory agency; five of them use dichotomous variables and the others use indices, but none of them measures independence in practice. In most (but not all) cases the measures that have been used so far have a positive impact on some performance measures (typically, network penetration, see Table 1 ). (2005, 25) argue that independence is more than a group of formal institutional rules; it also has important informal aspects which usually depend on centuries of legal and political traditions, cultural norms and individuals.
, at least for developing countries, to find credible (and consistent over time) alternatives to an independent regulatory agency.
We therefore think that more emphasis should be put on de facto regulatory independence. Edwards and Waverman (2005) suggest that there seems to be a negative correlation between formal (de jure) regulatory independence and independence in practice (de facto), because in those countries with weak informal mechanisms to ensure regulatory independence, these are compensated with strong formal arrangements in order to persuade potential investors that there is no regulatory bias.
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The drawback of legal indices or dichotomous variables which measure regulatory independence is that they only reflect the state of legislation, and events and politicians may leave the law aside.
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Thus there is the need to enlarge the data bases to develop empirical work which tests the effects of a well functioning regulatory regime using data about the process or practice of regulation, for example, as stated by Levine, et al. (2005, 469) , by
An implication of this is that inferences derived from such data sets for telecommunications, electricity and other industries can potentially give distorted pictures about the real effect of regulatory governance, as Stern and Cubbin (2003, 22 ) point out.
6 See Gutierrez (2003a) and Levine et al. (2005) 7 However, they do not measure empirically the practice of independence in their work. 8 An illustrative example of the problems of appointment, continuity and independence of commissioners in a regulatory agency is the regulation of electricity in India, where laws establish that commissioners' appointments must be for 5 years with a compulsory retirement age of 62. Most commissioners are appointed around 60 years old, so that they can only stay in their jobs for 2 or 3 years, according to Stern and Cubbin (2003, 18) . The measurement of independence in practice for Central Banks is quite developed in the literature.
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As a proxy for independence in practice he uses the average time (or turnover ratio) in the position of Central Bank governor or chairman. Cukierman (1992, 383) clarifies that there is no obvious measure of actual (in practice) independence as opposed to legal Central Bank independence. He points out that this is not because it is not important, but "because it is difficult to find a group of systematic measures of actual independence when this diverges from legal independence". He finds that the measure of legal independence and the turnover rate of the Central Bank governor differ by a larger amount in developing rather than in developed countries.
According to Eijffinger and De Haan (1996) a Central
Bank is independent if its monetary policy is not influenced by political cycles or by the preferences of politicians. As an example of the empirical literature on Central Bank independence, Cukierman (1992) creates a 16-variable legal index for 68 countries, reporting data on (i) hiring and firing rules for the Chairman; (ii) policy formulation;
(iii) final objectives, and (iv) borrowing limitations. Cukierman and Webb (1995) calculate yet another variable of independence in practice which they call (political) vulnerability index. This reflects the political influence in the central bank by measuring the probability that the Central Bank governor will be replaced immediately after a political change in government. They use a sample of 67 countries for the 1950 to 1989 period. They find that in a six months period the governor changes in half of the cases after a non-radical (i.e., not related to a military rebellion, restoration of democracy or constitutional change) political change.
They find that it is much less likely that the governor changes after six months of a routine transition in the Executive. There exists high variation among countries, and a large difference between developing (change in one quarter of cases) and developed 9 See also Wallsten (2003) or Estache et al. (2006) . 10 See Eijffinger and De Haan (1996) , De Haan and Kooi (2000) and Arnone, Laurens and Segalotto (2006) . countries (change in one tenth of cases). They also find that their measure is correlated with the level and variance of inflation, with real growth and with real interest rates.
The authors show that the frequency of governor changes is higher the closer the date of the political transition. They stress that the political turnover measure by itself is an imperfect measure of independence in practice. A low ratio does not necessarily mean high independence (in some cases such as Denmark, United Kingdom or Iceland it is; but not in others such as countries with stable authoritarian regimes). Instead, they argue that a high ratio does reflect low Central Bank independence, because high turnover ratios mean that the governor's period is shorter than the executive's and this makes the governor more vulnerable to the influence of the President or the political majorities. And hence will be less prone to try to implement long run policies. (2000) analyze Central Bank independence in practice for 82 developing countries. They conclude that (lack of) independence is only correlated with inflation if we take into account countries with large price increases. They report that independence works better in developed rather than in developing countries. 11 Table 1 summarizes the evidence. 
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The Construction of Measures of Independent Regulation in Practice
In this Section, we first explain the data collection process about the beginning Therefore, to obtain the necessary data we resorted mainly to three groups of sources:
. 12 We think of the head of the agency as the most important member of the institution. We are aware of examples, such as Colombia, where government of the agency is in the hands of a council where each member has the same weight and the presidency rotates among the members (16 months each). 13 For Haiti and Guyana it was impossible to obtain complete data for the period. We also exclude Cuba and Puerto Rico for their specific political or market characteristics. Although it is created on August 30th 1995, the first president of CONATEL starts his tenure on this date. g.
We did not find the exact dates, so we approximated according to the fact that the Superintendent is appointed by the new Ministry of Communications and Infrastructure. We assumed that the turnover coincided with the change from Portillo to Berger in the country (January 1994). We also revised the public signed documents in the web page of SIT; the last document signed by José Orellana is on December 2003 and the first signed by Oscar Chinchilla is on May 2004.
h.
We did not find the exact dates, and assumed that the turnover coincided with the change from Arzú to Portillo in the country (January 2000). We also revised the signed documents published in the web page of SIT. The last document signed by José Toledo is from December 1999 and the first signed by José Orellana is from April 2000.
i.
We did not find the exact dates, so we approximated following signed documents published in the web page of SIT. The last document signed by Mario Paz is from January 1999 and the first signed by José Toledo is from April 1999. We did not find the exact dates, so we approximated based on signed documents published in the web page of SIT. The last document signed by José Toledo is from August 1998 and the first one signed by Mario Paz is from October 1998. k.
We did not find the exact dates, so we approximated following signed resolutions published in the web page of CONATEL. The first resolution signed by David Matamoros is from January 2004. We did not find the exact dates, so we approximated following speeches available on the web page of OUR We did not find the exact dates of the departure of Rolando Rivas and the arrival of Mario Montenegro. We approximated following notes on the activities of both in newspaper "El Nuevo Diario" and a note on Nicaragua Country Commercial Guide 1996 from the U.S. Department of State.
n.
It is created on January 29 th 1996 but it starts functioning in August.
o.
The law creating it is from May 25th 1995 but it starts functioning on July 1996.
p.
There are laws from 1991 and 1993. But it starts functioning on 1994. There is no precedent in the literature for measuring the independence in practice of TRA's. Drawing from the studies on Central Bank independence, we construct three variables that try to reflect the independence in practice through (i) the index of political vulnerability, that is, the number of months that elapse between a change in the country's executive power and a change in the head/director of the agency; (ii) the turnover rate, which measures the average actual duration in months of the regulator; and (iii) the practical independence index which gives a time-varying measure of independence which depends on the reason for which the head/director of the agency leaves his or her position.
Political Vulnerability Index
It is well known from the literature on Central bank independence that political changes may trigger changes in economic institutions. 18 As mentioned in the first section, Cukierman and Webb (1995) present an index of political vulnerability for Central Bank governors for countries all over the world. They argue that computing the turnover rate of the governor relative to political changes is important to evaluate the size and effect of these in the frequency of regulatory turnover. They think of this index as a measure of political influence. Thus, the formula of the index of (inverse) political vulnerability of TRA is defined for each country as the fraction of political transitions (characterized here as political changes as a result of which there is a new president or prime minister) that are not quickly followed by a replacement in the director/chair of agency:
Number of regulators that stay in his or her position for i months after a political transition , i = 1, … n Number of political transitions Cukierman and Webb (1995) use in the numerator the number of political replacements, whereas we use the number of regulators that stay in his or her position for i months after a political transition. The reason for the change is that we want to give a higher score to less political influence in TRA. When measuring turnover in the head of TRA's in Latin America, we find that in 61% of occasions there is a change in the head of the agency within 1 month. If we take six months, in 73% of times in which there is a change in president there is turnover in the head of the TRA. If we take one year, the ratio rises to 88%.
With the above mentioned information about turnover in TRA's, we have chosen one month after a political change in the country as period of analysis for our sample. 19 20 Among the weaknesses of the index of inverse vulnerability for TRA's, one is that it does not take into account those changes in the regulator during the remainder of the presidential period and which have a political motivation, be it because it took place after 1 month since the political transition, or because there has been more than one change of regulator during one president's period. In some of these cases, they are forced resignations for political motives or rivalries which do not involve a change in the executive. 21 There are also changes in the regulator due to cabinet reshuffles, promotions or resignations to run for elected jobs. 22 There are also interesting cases of directors who resign to find a job in the firms that they previously regulated, what is known in the literature as "revolving doors phenomenon". 23 19 We chose one month because as reported most changes of regulator take place after 1 month.
These changes are not reflected in the index of inverse vulnerability, but a turnover rate or the frequency of changes would capture them. Another weakness of the measure is its failure to take into 20 Barbados, Brazil and Jamaica are the only Latin American and Caribbean countries where the new country's president kept the same director at least for one year after taking office. In Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador and Guatemala when the president takes office, by law, the president must choose a new agency's head. 21 One of the most representative cases is Argentina, where there have been 11 directors of regulatory agency CNC (previously CNT) in our period, and we only counted three for the index. Only in the presidency of Carlos Menem there were 7 different directors. The local press also reflects other cases of political pressures to force the resignation of the director, like in Bolivia, Brazil and Panama; or resignations due to differences amongst cabinet ministers, like in Chile; or resignations due to a change in party membership of the head of the agency, like in Nicaragua. 22 We find examples in Mexico, where a director became cabinet minister; in Nicaragua and Venezuela two regulators became ministers. In Paraguay one agency head resigned to run for Parliament elections. 23 In Nicaragua a Director General became executive of the country's subsidiary of the Spanish electricity firm Unión FENOSA. In Panama a former regulator founded and chaired a local and long distance telecommunications firm; in Colombia a former commissioner founded a consulting firm working for a cellular telephony firm; in Paraguay the government appointed the president of the agency as director general of the state-owned telecommunications monopoly. For an analysis of the revolving door phenomenon, see for example Che (1995) and Salant (1995) .
account other forms of de facto influence of governments on regulators apart from removal of the agency head.
Another situation that is not measured in the vulnerability index are those cases where the head of the agency is a member of the Executive (vulnerability 0.00) but where the period in office in longer than the region's average, especially in countries with high stability in their cabinets and presidential periods.
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Turnover rate
The turnover rate measures the average actual duration in months of the time in office of the director or chair of the agency. It is a simple and interesting figure. In many cases, the regulator does not complete the prescribed period in office. Belize, Peru and Jamaica (see Table 3 ). Notice that the most stable countries are former British colonies and Chile.
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Note that the prescribed time in office can usually be evaded without violating the law, but clearly affecting the degree of independence.
We also computed the frequency of change, which denotes the average turnover per year in the TRA's, a high frequency signalling continuous changes of regulator.
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24 Chile is the clearest of these cases. It has a low inverse vulnerability index, but the period in office of the telecommunications deputy secretary (the non-independent regulator, actually a cabinet minister) is longer than the region's average. For our period, in this country there has been only one regulator that has not finished his period with the country's president.
If we focus on the 17 countries which have a period established by law, only in four of them the regulator completed the full period: Belize, Jamaica, Uruguay and Peru (which actually goes beyond the prescribed period), and the remainder (with the exception of Bolivia, Colombia and Surinam), stay in approximately half of the prescribed period (see Table   4 ). 
Practical Independence Index
Together with the information on dates of beginning and end of periods in office, we also obtained information on the reason publicly given for which the head of the agency left his or her position (the full list of reasons is available upon request). The index of independence in practice (PI) uses this information. It is computed as follows:
we give a value of 0 when the regulator is dismissed or fired; we give a value of 1 to any other reason for leaving the position, except for those cases where the established period ends (change of government or disappearance of the agency); and we give a value of 2 when the regulator stays in his or her position to the end of the established period.
This index does not directly interact with political transitions, but makes it possible to have a time-varying index that includes information about all changes at the top of the agency.
The Index of Independence in Law and in Practice (LPI1 and LPI2)
The vulnerability index has a clear limitation when it comes to its use in statistical analysis: it is an average figure for all the studied period, so that it only takes 
Rankings
Concerning the relative position of the 23 countries (see Table 4 Edwards and Waverman (2006) and Gual and Trillas (2006) .
In general, the countries occupying the first places at LPI1 and LPI2 show a correct legal framework, and the longevity of some of their directors, together with the fact that turnover takes place long after political change and/or the head is not dismissed.
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The ten lowest positions are occupied by countries characterized by agencies that are part of a Ministry, so with little legal independence, and hence where independence in practice is meaningless (Chile and Surinam); or by rules prescribing that new governments must appoint regulators (Dominican Republic and Guatemala); or by a high politicization in the appointment of the head of the agency so that turnover is frequent (Nicaragua).
Concerning examples of countries that experience clear changes in their relative positions, we note that El Salvador for instance has a correct legal framework but a low level of independence de facto combined with the legal framework. Conversely, Jamaica has a low position in terms of legal framework, but a high position when this legal framework is combined with independence in practice. We are interested in measuring the impact of regulatory independence on network penetration in fixed telephony. Although in developed countries access to a telephone line is usually taken for granted, this is not the case for many developing countries. In our region of study for our sample years (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) , many countries had very low levels of telephone penetration to start with, and the cross country and time variation is high. Graph 1 shows for example the evolution of telephone penetration for Brasil, El Salvador, Panama and Venezuela. Of all these, the country that reached the highest growth was Brasil, still falling below the 25% level by the end of the sample period.
To analyze the impact of independence on telecommunications performance, the general model we use can be expressed as:
where X it = (X 2it , X 3it , … X Kit ) are the explanatory variables, including an independence index (IR1, LPI1 or LPI2) and control variables. Β = (Β 1 ,Β 2 , … Β K ) are their respective parameters and μ it is an error term. We use individual fixed effects for the 23 countries.
The error term is modelled as:
where μ i denotes non-observable individual effects and ν it denotes the remainder of the residual.
The performance dependent variable Y it in equation (1) Along the lines of other work in this field we expect that network expansion can be potentially affected by the economic structure and industry institutions. For this reason we control for two economic structure variables: GDP measured in purchasing power parity per capita (GDPppp) and population density. We obtained those variables from the data base of the World Bank. We expect that an increase in income per capita and density are associated with higher demand for communications and telephone services.
LPI1 and LPI2 are our main explanatory variable of interest.
Our starting point is a cross section regression of average telephone penetration over the sample period for each country, to average GDP per capita and average population density. This has an adjusted R square of 0.75, both coefficients are positive and significant despite a very low number of observations (23), and the p-value associated to the F test is 0. If we add as regressors either lpi1, ir1 or vul1 (the latter, not shown in the table) to this regression, the coefficients on gdp and density keep their sign and significance. In the regressions where lpi1 or vul1 are added, the coefficient on the independence variable is negative and non-significant, whereas the adjusted R square value barely changes. However, when the ir1 index is added (see Table 6 ), this has a negative impact which is significant at the 10% level and the adjusted R square improves. This negative and weakly significant result is very similar to that found by Gual and Trillas (2004) for a different group of 37 countries in a cross section exercise.
The negative relationship between ir1 and lines penetration may be due to reverse causation: when line penetration is very low, the marginal productivity of independence increases and this may encourage policy makers to increase independence. This coefficient ceases to be significant when ir1 is instrumented by polconiii (an index 31 of political and institutional constraints developed 32 by Henisz and Zelner), 33 but the Hausman test indicates that the difference between OLS and IV coefficients is not significant (although the IV coefficients are lower in magnitude, though still negative).
However, with such small sample, the usefulness of IV is very doubtful, since it has good properties only asymptotically. 31 The data base on "policy constraints" due to Henisz (2000) is based on four variables that help estimate the probability of policy reversal for the period between 1900 and 2004, for 234 countries. 32 For the study of the privatization, liberalization and regulation of telecommunications, it has been used by Henisz and Zeller (2001) , Trillas (2004 and and mentioned by Gutierrez (2003b) and Jamison et al. (2005) . Henisz, Zelner and Guillen (2005) create and use a data base with three variables to measure (formal) regulator independence, competition and privatization for 205 countries in the period . Both data bases can be obtained in http://www-management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/ 33 Polconiii has a 0.5 correlation coefficient with ir1 and a -0.1 correlation coefficient with lines penetration. The correlation coefficient between lines penetration and vul1 is 0.1. This is surprising, since one would expect that legal independence is a substitute for other constraints (for example, Chile does not need independence because it has other constraints), but that other constraints help to keep in practice whatever level of legal independence is prescribed by law. The results rather indicate that legal independence is on average a complement of other constraints.
Static panel data
We report static panel data estimates with country fixed effects instrumenting for independence and not instrumenting for it (Table 7) . We use five indices of independence:
-IR1, a legal independence index similar to the one used in Gual and Trillas(2004) .
-PI, the index of vulnerability of the regulators that varies with time presented in the previous section.
-LPI1, which multiplies IR1 and the vulnerability index at one month reported in the previous section.
-LPI2, which multiplies IR1 and PI.
-LPI3, an index that adds an equally weighted sum of the eleven original components of IR1 plus the vulnerability index.
In all regressions, we control for GDP per capita in purchasing power parity and for density. Both have a positive and significant impact in all regressions.
As it can be seen from the results, adding issues of "independence in practice" to a legal independence index changes the magnitude of the impact but not the sign or the In addition to the independence indices used in table 7, when we do allphalf (an index that gives half the weight to ir1 and the other half to the vulnerability index) without instrumenting the coefficient is 6.481195, which statistically is highly significant. In the regressions where independence is considered exogenous, the R square is the within R square. In the regressions where independence is endogenous the R square is the centered R square, as reported by Stata. -Measurement error, both because in international comparisons we may be comparing slightly differing dimensions and because in aggregating through an index we may assign arbitrary weights.
-Reverse causality, because as mentioned in the cross section exercise, a low penetration level may trigger measures to increase penetration, such as regulatory independence.
-Omitted regressors, because institutions or social preference may at the same time be causing a high penetration level and a high level of independence.
Hence, since we were suspicious of potential endogeneity problems in our independence measures, in columns 6-10 we endogenize the independence indices by two politico-institutional variables, efi (economic freedom index, an index developed by the Fraser Institute) and staff (a relative measure of the size of the incumbent operator).
In column 3 we need an additional instrument to run the overidentification test, and we use polconiii. Except in column 10 where the instruments turn out to be weak, in all the other tests the instrumental variable estimates are higher in magnitude than the estimates computed without instrumenting. Using the LPI1 index, for example, the regression results treating independence as exogenous imply that, if the model is correct, when a country has the independence level in 2004 of the highest country in the ranking (Peru), it has 4 more lines per 100 inhabitants than when it has the independence level of the lowest country in the ranking, Costa Rica, everything else constant. However, if independence is (correctly) treated as endogenous, the impact of the difference is to have 7.6 more lines. We conclude that treating regulatory independence as exogenous may substantially underestimate the impact of independence on network penetration. However, finding good instruments is difficult, since only in the regression in column 6 the instruments were fully convincing, at least in the narrow sense of passing the overidentification Sargan test and a weak exogeneity test, although in all cases the null hypothesis of exogeneity was rejected using the In column 9, the Crag-Donald Wald F statistic of weak exogeneity of the instruments is 131.131, which is above the Stock-Yogo critical value at 10% of 19.93, meaning that the hypothesis of weak exogeneity is rejected. The Sargan statistic of overidentification is 3.288 with a P-value of 0.0698, which does not reject that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error, but only at the 5% level. Finally, the chisquare value of the Hausman test is 13.27, with an associated p-value of 0.004, which 34 Other instruments such as reg and checks were tried, but the test results were even weaker.
rejects the hypothesis that there is no difference between the IV estimates and the conventional panel data with fixed effects estimates.
In column 10, the Crag-Donald Wald F statistic of weak exogeneity of the instruments is 1.931, which is below the Stock-Yogo critical value at 10% of 13.43, meaning that the hypothesis of weak exogeneity is not rejected in this case. The Sargan statistic of overidentification is 4.089 with a P-value of 0.04, which does not reject that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error, but only at the 5% level. Finally, the chi-square value of the Hausman test is 7.79 with an associated p-value of 0.05, which rejects the hypothesis that there is no difference between the IV estimates and the conventional panel data with fixed effects estimates.
The data confirm that more realistic measures of independence still have a positive and significant impact on network penetration. Although the coefficients measuring legal or legal and practice independence have different magnitude we do not want to over-emphasize this difference at this stage, since we are aware that as with any index, the components and weights are to some extent arbitrary. We only point out here that, with this preliminary analysis (which bring the empirical literature on regulation one step closer to the more advanced empirical literature on Central Bank independence) regulator independence matters, even when we take into account the problems that governments face of committing to respect the independence of the regulator.
Dynamic panel
In a dynamic panel estimation (adding lagged penetration as a right-hand side variable), ir1 and lpi1 have a positive non significant impact (see Table 8 ).
The results show that when adding the lag dependent variable, independence and the other variables lose explanatory power, although they still have the same sign. In When both a legal index and a practice index for independence are introduced as independent regressors, neither of them are significant when treated as exogenous, although they enter with a positive sign. When treated as endogenous, the instruments in this case are weak according to the Stock-Yogo critical values, and the chi-sqaure
Hausman test does not reject that independence is exogenous, although with the same computational problems as the ones mentioned for ir1 and lpi.
Conclusions
This article takes the suggestion made in the conclusions of several empirical studies on the measurement and impact of regulatory independence, and makes the first effort to measure the practice of regulatory independence in TRA's. The literature has evolved from a seminal stage where independence was measured using a dummy 0-1 variable, to a stage where the use of legal de jure independence indices has become quite common. Gutierrez (2003a) is perhaps the study that has made most progress along these lines.
We take this evolution one step forward, by i) Obtaining detailed information about the practice of independence in 23
Latin American and Caribbean countries between 1990 and 2004.
ii) Constructing with this information indices of independence that combine legal and practice issues, borrowing from the methodology used in the Central Bank Independence literature.
iii) Quantifying the impact of this better measured regulator independence on network penetration for telecommunications markets.
For example, the legal indices used so far computed the prescribed number of years that the head of agency was allowed to stay in office. With our index, we correct this legal prescription with the actual time period that the regulator is in office. Estimation results confirm that regulator independence is associated to higher network penetration in Latin American and Caribbean telecommunications markets, but the magnitude and statistical significance of this impact are probably low and difficult to assess. Besides this, treating independence as exogenous, as done so far in the literature, may underestimate the impact of regulatory independence.
